Abstract
Introduction
This paper explores how and why police came to participate in war crimes and ethnically targeted violence in the Krajina region of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)
1
. Based on an analysis of the trials of Radoslav Brđanin, Mićo Stanišić and Stojan Župljanin, I argue that a number of factors come together to produce a police organisation capable of carrying out widespread ethnic violence. These include legacies inherited from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in the areas of defence, policing and the allocation of state jobs, and as BiH democratised, a particular pattern of ethnic polarization and attempts by ethnically-oriented parties to control key state positions. In the run up to the war and during its early stages, police in the Krajina and elsewhere were politicised, deprofessionalised and militarised, facilitating their role in in ethnic violence and ethnic cleansing. I begin with a brief account of existing work on police and war crimes, and the criminology of war crimes. While frameworks for multi-level analyses are being developed, this study remains focused on organisational, (emerging) state and international levels, and will not include individual micro-level explanations. I locate the study in relation to other recent work using judicial sources, sketch out the rationale behind case selection and introduce the analytical approach. Findings are presented in two sections. The first sketches out an empirical description of police involvement in ethnic violence; the second seeks to outline the explanatory factors evident from the two cases selected.
Police and the Organisation of Atrocity Crime
The role that police have played in genocides and atrocity crimes is well recognised (e.g. Browning 2001; Bloxham 2001) . Police are among a limited number of state agents empowered to use force (Alvarez 2001: 74) , and along with soldiers and militia, it is claimed that "police officers are conditioned, not only to obey superior officers, but also to use violence" (Alvarez 2001: 96) . While this points to their potential role in violent state action against civilians, it risks naturalising police participation as easy and unthinking. There are a number of problems 3 with such a position. It reflects an assumption that those who complete police training are the same uniformed personnel carrying out ethnically targeted violence. In societies undergoing relatively rapid change, there may be important changes in the composition of the police and limited opportunities for training (Kutnjak-Ivković and Haberfeld 2000: 199) . Even if the police involved in violence have completed a normal training process, the difficulty of conditioning people to use violence should not be underestimated (Grossman 1996) . Likewise, police are trained to use specific forms of violence in specific circumstances. Beyond the technical skills of violence, theory suggests that other factors are important, such as ideological conviction 2 . Finally, historical research (e.g. Bloxham 2003 , Browning 2001 ) and recent sociological and criminological work (e.g. Collins 2009 , Klusemann 2012) show that violence unfolds over time and the steps along the way are important to any explanation. This requires a careful examination of the background and processes of change affecting police involved in ethnic violence. Recent work in criminology and other disciplines indicates the benefit of multi-level analyses (see Aitchison 2014, 30-40 for a summary). In particular, the work of van Baar and Huisman (2012) is a good example of the value of studying organisational settings in a way which links the individual with the state. Taking the police as an organisational setting in which individual action is structured and facilitated, I focus primarily on the meso-macro connections. For example, at the macro-level, international attempts to impose restrictions on military deployment encouraged the greater use of police in military roles. While the paper does not deal with the individual in any detail an expansion of the evidence base by looking at cases against offenders lower down in political or organisational hierarchies would support analysis in that area.
Methods and Approach
The research uses a sample partly dictated by convenience: testimony and evidence presented at the ICTY. The tribunal has gathered together a huge amount of evidence, live and written testimony, but this is subject to processes of selection dictated by procedural guidelines and prosecutorial and defence strategies. Bloxham (2001, 2-3) notes that the Nuremburg tribunals left an incomplete picture, neglecting some of the most egregious police atrocities. The ICTY cases include a clear focus on police activities, covering a range of levels within police organisations. Within the convenience sample represented by the ICTY cases, a further level of purposive sampling is applied. In order to explore police organisation and actions at a regional level, two particular cases were selected. In Brđanin, a leading local politician in the Krajina was prosecuted, and in Stanišić and Župljanin, the Minister of the Interior in the breakaway Bosnian Serb Republic and the leading Krajina police chief faced the chamber. Together, these cases give an insight into republican and regional political and police leadership. It would have been possible to select a different authority and a different territory based on ICTY records. Further case studies are planned to allow meaningful comparison of police activities across conflicts in the former Yugoslavia (particularly elsewhere in Bosnia, in Croatia, Kosovo and Macedonia). The case of the Bosnian Krajina is one of the best documented and makes a logical starting point.
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Criminal Justice Issues -Year XIV, No. 5-6, 2014 , while Buss (2014) contrasts judicial constructions of patriarchy with witness testimony. I do not suggest the documents provide the 'thick' description Mullins identified in the ICTR records (2009, 720), nonetheless the cases provide a rich resource. Further, by utilising existing sources in the first instance, research can be conducted without the necessity of harming potential respondents who experienced horrific and traumatic events. The kind of difficulties this could create are evident in the courtroom discussion of the impact of giving evidence on protected witness BT12
.
The two cases were subject to a preliminary coding process using NVivo, highlighting police action alongside military action, political organisation, particular forms of violence, population transfers, theft and exploitation, detention camps, the distribution of arms and other salient features. Following the coding, the nodes were reviewed and analysed individually or crossreferenced with one another. For example, cross referencing the nodes 'detention camp' and 'police' brought up 159 references from Brđanin testimony and a further 253 from Stanišić and Župljanin
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. From this process I derive the descriptive account of police violence and a narrative on democratisation, deprofessionalisation and militarisation.
Describing Police Violence
The police contribution to ethnic cleansing through the creation of an inhospitable environment for non-Serbs, forced transfers of population and murder ranges from omissions in normal policing tasks through to active participation in violence. This includes joint activities with paramilitaries, the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), and from May 1992, the Army of the Serb Republic (VRS). This section describes a number of interconnected police activities: disarmament programmes; the holding of non-Serbs in detention camps; interrogations; individual arrests; and cooperation in military operations resulting in deaths and the capture of large numbers of non-Serb civilians. 
Disarmament
In many Krajina municipalities, Serb authorities, including the police, pursued the selective disarmament of Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats. This can be contrasted with a policy of accommodation and cooperation with irregular armed formations
7
. Through disarmament Serb authorities sought to secure a monopoly over the material means of physical violence in what fits with Kaoullas' description of a chaotic security structure 8 , but this also forms an integral part of wider attacks on non-Serb communities and the detention of large numbers of civilians. Concerns regarding the distribution of weapons in the former Yugoslavia were evident prior to the BiH elections in 1990, when there were orders for the JNA to secure weapons held at in municipalities by the territorial defence (TO). As this shifts to weapon collection programmes targeting individuals, the military continued to play an important role 9 but were joined by civilian police and the TO. Weapons taken in by the civilian police included those retained after military service, illegally procured arms and legally owned and registered pistols and rifles 10 . Some police and crisis staff documentation suggests that a focus only on illegal weapons
11
, but other police documents extend this to legally held guns 12 . There is variation across municipalities. In Čelinac, a resolution imposed a range of restrictions on non-Serb citizens including a bar on possession of weapons 13 . In some municipalities police issued receipts for weapons taken 14 . Other areas saw irregular seizures of weapons with no attempt to create records or issue receipts 15 . Although calls for weapons to be surrendered were often phrased in general terms not specifying ethnicity, they clearly targeted non-Serbs. Amir Džonlić noted that while Bosniaks were surrendering weapons, Serbs, including his colleagues, were being armed 16 . A number of witnesses noted that they only knew of disarmament being targeted at non-Serbs, and in non-Serb neighbourhoods, while Serb villages retained their weapons 17 . Radio broadcasts explicitly targeted nonSerbs with calls to surrender arms , large scale detention of civilians in camps 21 and, both before and after the expiry of deadlines, threatened and actual shelling and other military attack
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. Some arrests resulted in prosecution
23
, but the scarcity of cases of illegal possession of weapons forwarded by police 24 suggests that the primary goal of the Serb authorities was not to use criminal law to process and punish those with unregistered weapons.
Detention camps
A number of witnesses, including non-Serb detainees and members of the Serb Ministry of the Interior (MUP), testify in relation to detention sites described as collection centres, concentration camps, prisoner of war camps and prisons. There is often ambiguity over who controls these facilities. For example the sports hall in Sanski Most was guarded by men in both camouflage and pre-war police milicija uniforms isfaction over the use of police alongside the army, it is clear that there was close cooperation between police and military forces in relation to the network of detention sites. Camp detainees were held in inhumane conditions. A degree of improvisation is evident in the use of schools, garages and other industrial facilities. They were crowded, had inadequate provision for nutrition and personal hygiene, and often inmates would have to sleep on hard floors. They were variously humiliated and denigrated, beaten and killed. Beatings took place at the detention facilities where police provided security or occupied command positions. During a visit of political delegates to the Omarska facility, detainees were forced to give Serb salutes, to sing Serb songs, and to shout 'this is Serbia' , targeted for killings, were not only those who had been captured in combat, but included those in leading functions, wealthy citizens and an intellectual or professional group 48 . Such testimony suggests a strategy to undermine or destroy the Bosniak community by removing those playing a role in organisation and representation. . Some detainees were taken in individual arrests by the police. Jakov Marić, knew his captors and the inspector who interthat the clearest and strongest evidence with surviving eye-witnesses forms the basis of the judgment. An association of camp detainees has evidence of around 700 killings (Dzidic 2013 . Other evidence on transfers includes an account of a march from Sitnica to Manjaca under police and military guard. Along the route, the men were exposed to abuse by the people of the villages they passed 58 . In some cases, police acted to protect non-Serbs during transfers or in detention. These are limited, but indicate points where police break from the script of persistent, repeated and serious abuse and violence. Grgo Stojić highlighted one of his captors at Betonirka who, unlike others, would allow prisoners water to drink and to wash in
Targeted arrests and transportation to camps
Even in camps under military authority, police played a role in arresting, transporting and interrogating detainees, indicating coordination between police and military authorities. Adil Draganović from Sanski Most spent time in police detention before being transported, along with 22 or 23 other prominent Bosniak citizens, some with visible injuries on their faces, to the military camp at Manjaca. He identified the Sanski Most uniformed police chief, Drago Vujinić
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. Mirzet Karabeg's transfer from Betonirka to Manjaca was overseen by an officer who reassured detainees that they were safe. No one on the transfer was harassed or mistreated and the journey took the shortest route possible
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. This might seem like a small mercy as detainees were shifted from one brutal detention facility to another, but in light of evidence of deaths and beatings on other transfers, it shows some police officers managed to retain a degree of decency. In Prnjavor, detainees suggested that violence was not as prevalent as that described elsewhere. One man, detained at the Sloga factory said that inmates were reassured by Police Chief Radoslav Vasić, and only gave one example of a police guard hitting an inmate, after which the officer apologised 61 . Locals were allowed to bring food, but conditions could become more restrictive if guards lost family members in battle and at weekends, men in military dress would come and threaten the inmates 62 . In these cases, the police officers appear to act on the basis of a generalised attitude to detainees. Others protected individuals on the basis of pre-war associations 63 .
Violence outside camps and police facilities
The camps created a relatively contained environment in which violence was observed. Those who survived the war were able to testify about their own experience and the abuse of others. Violence, including that perpetrated by the police, was also prevalent outside. The police cooperated with military forces in violent attacks on villages and were involved in individual 54 . Garibović was on a busload of men lined up and shot. He was pushed into the canyon by the man behind him, so survived. Clothing lying in the canyon and a bad smell suggested this was not the first mass killing at the site 65 . Police threw grenades into the canyon to kill any survivors 66 , but Garibović reported that there were still noises coming from the wounded in the early hours of the morning 
A hostile environment
This section has provided a description of police action in the Krajina region. In the context of the strategic goals of the Serb authorities to separate the peoples of BiH and to secure territory, it can be seen how a combination of killings, detention and harassment, in which police played a key role, sought to rid the area of non-Serbs by elimination and by creating a hostile environment to promote mass population movements out of the region. The following section shifts from description to develop an explanation of how a formerly multi-ethnic organisation can be transformed to support such a strategy.
Explaining Police Violence
Three important developments during the late stages of socialist rule and early days of multiparty electoral democracy in BiH change the structure and function of the police. Firstly, the democratisation process, the dominance of ethnically-oriented parties and the resultant polarisation; secondly polarisation in police agencies and subsequent fragmentation and deprofessionalisation; finally, the militarisation of the police.
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Democratisation and political polarisation
The first multi-party elections and ethnic polarisation are a well-rehearsed topic (Bieber 2014; Malcolm 1996, 217-22) . In elections in November and December 1990, 75 per cent supported nationalist parties. The three main ethnically-based parties, the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ), Party for Democratic Action (SDA) and Serb Democratic Party (SDS) secured 202 of 240 seats in the Republican Assembly (Malcolm 1996, 222) . Stojanović argues that these elections form an important turning point (2014, 620). The lack of anti-communist civic alternatives (Stojanović 2014, 615) and resulting power sharing between three parties representing different ethnic communities provides important contextual background for the processes of politicisation and deprofessionalisation discussed in the next section. Both Bieber (2014, 553) and Stojanović (2014, 620) identify minimum consensus between parties found, aside from the principle of dividing republican, municipal and socially-owned institutions and offices between themsleves. The agreement that these were to be divided shows continuity with party penetration of state institutions common under communism (Kornai 1992, 37 ) allbeit transposed to a new multi-party context. There is also continuity of an arrangement known as the ethnic key, applied to key functions in BiH from 1974 onwards (Kapidžić 2015, 314) . In evidence, Dragomir Adnan, explained that in SFRY, various factors were considered in leadership appointements beyond the basic requirement of party membership: a candidate's work record, and the ethnic balance of key positions 73 . Attachment to a party remains important after multiparty elections, but with three parties rather than one. In many cases, experience is disregarded and people with no police background are appointed to leading positions or relatively junior staff are promoted rapidly. The relative strength of etnically-based parties becomes something of a proxy for working out the relevant ethnic composition on the basis of local-and republic-level inter-party agreements. Agreement that roles and functions should be distributed across the parties does not mean agreement on the specific allocations.
Politicisation and deprofessionalisation
Assessments of the role of parties in personnel policy vary from the suggestion that they were trying to "exert some sort of influence" 74 to descriptions of the radicalisation of personnel policy 75 . One senior Serb officer described a process of "peaceful lustration"
76
, achieved through early retirement and shifting people around within the MUP. Examining, reassigning and removing public service personnel was common in post-communist transitions (Horne and Levi 2004, 52), but the Bosnian experience has been overshadowed by the subsequent war and dismissals which followed (Aitchison 2011, 83-84). Police professionals, and appointees with no previous policing experience and party members agree that the parties put forward their In terms of leadership positions, party appointees were described as falling short of the requirements of the job
79
. In many cases, appointees had no background in policing. It was claimed that Talundžić, the Chief of Police appointed by the SDA in Prijedor "had no other experience with the police other than when he was stopped by [sic] drink driving"
80
. After an armed takeover of Prijedor by SDS, Simo Drljača, from the education services was put in charge 81 , in turn succeeded by a mathematics teacher 82 . In Kotor Varoš, Savo Tepić, an engineer with no experience of policing was appointed as Chief of Police as the SDS candidate agreed upon by the HDZ and SDA 83 . In Ključ, the pre-election commander of the uniformed police had the support of the SDA and remained in post, while the Chief of Police was allocated to the SDS who appointed Vinko Kondić, formerly employed in a construction firm 84 . The attempts to secure leadership positions did not always run smoothly. In Kotor Varoš, the appointment of Muhamad Sadiković, an SDA nominee from outside the police was obstructed by the regional police chief on the grounds that there was an experienced Muslim officer in post already 85 . Sadiković's description of the wrong this represented illustrates the nexus established between ethnicity, party and senior police office: The SDA, as the legal party of the Bosniak people, had the right to nominate candidates 86 At the level of police leadership a number of points can be observed. Firstly, regardless of the professional background of those in leading positions, party-based nomination meant that candidates owed their jobs to political parties and were likely to be loyal or sympathetic to their aims 87 . Secondly, candidates that did not meet pre-existing criteria diluted the professionalism of the police and new leaders were not schooled in the police values of SFRY. The lack of professional leadership was felt further down the hierarchy, with one Serb inspector
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suggesting that the crime police were "left to their own resources" 88 . While the leadership cadre might have a disproportionate impact on the direction of policing, irregularities were noted throughout the service. Police officials sacked over disciplinary or criminal matters were reappointed after elections 89 , normal appointment procedures were ignored for regular police officers and circumvented to stack the police reserve with party supporters 90 , and police ID was not properly regulated 91 . As BiH disintegrated and secessionist bodies like the Autonomous Region of Krajina (ARK) emerged, the ethno-political basis of appointments and dismissals became more explicit. From April 1992 onwards, wide scale dismissals occurred following Serb take overs of political power. After the MUP had divided at the end of March, a new statement of loyalty was required. Those not signing were dismissed, as was evident in Sanski Most in April 92 and in Ključ in May 93 , and dismissals extended to Serbs who would not accept the new arrangements 94 . A June 1992 decision by the ARK limited all positions involving the protection of public property not only to Serbs, but also excluded those "who have not confirmed by plebiscite or who in their minds are not clear that the Serbian Democratic Party is the sole representative of the Serbian people"
95 . The changes in the composition and the expansion of the police force in this way questions the assumption that police training forms an important part of the explanation for their role in atrocity crimes. Bekir Delić witnessed men as young as 16 or 17 in police uniform 96 , suggesting the use of untrained recruits. Rather, the police, once restructured along ethnic lines, provided an organisational framework and badge of convenience with access to the material means of violence. The development of the means of violence through the militarisation of the police is explored in the next section.
Militarisation
The militarisation of the police impacted upon the structure of the organisation, the skill set of its members, the tools available, and the opportunities for engagement in activities against civilian populations. While the police sought, at different points in time and at different levels of the organisation, to resist their utilisation in combat tasks, they were treated as another agency engaged in combat activities and pursuit of war aims
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. The use of police in military tasks during war and other extraordinary circumstances is based on the concept and law of All
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Transfers of military equipment from army to police was not unprecedented. A member of the former Federal Secretariat for the Interior noted that needs for particular special equipment would be communicated to the JNA
102
. Muhamad Sadiković, deputy commander in the Kotor Varoš police, noted that after mobilisation of the reserve, police had access to a warehouse of weapons including "automatic and semi-automatic weapons, hand held launchers, M-53 and short barrel guns"
103
. The nature of equipment subsequently sought by Serb police in the Krajina is evident from a request sent to the JNA and subsequently seen at a parade in Banja Luka and in other locations around the Krajina. The request, made by Župljanin in April, included helicopters, armoured vehicles, machine guns, sniper rifles, hand grenades and other explosives 104 . The local police chief in Banja Luka, Vladimir Tutus said that these were for use by a special police detachment, discussed below 105 . A number of witnesses recounted seeing the armoured vehicles, painted blue, at this parade 106 , and being used by Prijedor police
107
. The Ključ police commander described training given to a 'manoeuvring unit' from his municipality during February 1992, in which the Serb officers were trained in the use of mortars, Zolje (anti-tank weapons) mines and canons
108
. These units had traditionally played a role in major public order events. Along new equipment and training, the use of police camouflage uniforms became more prevalent 109 .
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Criminal Justice Issues -Year XIV, No. 5-6, 2014 . Internal police documents and police testimony give details of some of the casualties that arose from police deployment in this manner 123 .
The different dimensions of the apparent militarisation of the police support two separate conclusions. Firstly, the 'policeness' of those who appear to be a part of the police organisation is called into question. The wholesale transfer of personnel and weaponry from military and paramilitary units into police organisations, along with the deliberate blurring of the boundaries between the police and the army, suggest a fundamental change to the nature of the police in the Krajina region, potentially marginalising a residual core of police whose training and service date back to before the war. Secondly, through the regular utilisation of police in military roles, the potential of creating an embattled, brutalised force viewing their role in terms of securing their people from an enemy as opposed to securing a more general sense of order should be considered, and is worth exploring further through cases that deal with front line police officers in greater depth 124 .
Conclusion
I have used the testimony and evidence accessible through the ICTY to argue that the police in the Krajina region of Bosnia and Herzegovina were transformed into a tool of the SDS programme of ethnically targeted violence through processes of politicisation, selection, deprofessionalisation and militarisation. Although this was not inevitable, one can see the foundations in the organisation of policing and defence in SFRY, and in the ethnicisation of politics in Bosnia's democratic transition. It created a police force distanced from a professional ethos, in which a number of senior positions were held by ideologically committed party men with no previous police experience. Uncontrolled recruitment at lower levels and an absence of police 
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training left no scope for the transmission of professional values. Coupled with the military potential of a police force viewed, equipped and utilised as an integral part of the emerging state's military capacity, this helps explain the role of the police in atrocity crimes in the Krajina, especially in the period of spring to winter 1992. Any accounts of police and atrocity crimes need to take seriously the ways in which police organisations are transformed. In spite of recognised challenges in using material gathered for judicial processes, these findings show the potential of ICTY resources to build up original and detailed narratives as a foundation for frameworks to explain complex processes of organisational reorientation towards ethnically targeted atrocity crimes. This paper has focused at the level of the break-away Serb republic and one sub-region of police organisation. A number of cases prosecuted at the ICTY also offer the potential of findings not only about the changes in police organisations, but also about the front line police officers
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. Other cases allow comparison with authorities elsewhere in Bosnia and Yugoslavia
126
. Further, as domestic courts in BiH proceed to prosecute ever more low level cases, further resources with regards to frontline police will become available, extending our knowledge of how police become perpetrators of large scale violence 127 For interactive resources on domestic cases, see OSCE (undated).
